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I. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES, 
To the best of Mr. Holbrook's knowledge, there are no 
constitutional provisions, statues, ordinances, rules or 
regulations whose interpretation is solely determinative of the 
issues in this appeal. 
II. REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT MR. HOLBROOK'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REQUESTING FIREMASTER TO 
BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM AND PAY FOR A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
ACCOUNTING UNDER THE CONTRACTS. 
Firemaster replied with three reasons why in its view the 
accounting fees of Mr. Miller should not have been awarded to Mr. 
Holbrook. All three reasons are without substance. All three of 
Firemaster's arguments ignore the substance of the obligation of 
Firemaster to provide a fair and impartial accounting raised in Mr. 
Holbrook's appeal of this issue. Firemaster only argued the remedy 
suggested by Mr. Holbrook. 
The first reason set forth by Firemaster why the remedy 
suggested by Mr. Holbrook is not appropirate is, it claims Mr. 
Holbrook should have made a motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) for revision of the entry of the judgment, based 
upon the jury verdict finding the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship. 
What Firemaster ignores is that Mr. Holbrook made a 
motion for declaratory and other post trial relief, including to 
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receive his attorneys' fees, costs and the accounting fees of Mr. 
Miller. (R. 3143-3354). While not entitled specifically a Rule 
54(b) motion, in fact, after trial Mr. Holbrook did specifically 
request the court to award his accounting fees. The final 
judgments in this case reflect the Court's disposition of such 
requests (R. 3882-3891)(See addendum hereto, Exhibit A). 
Therefore, Mr. Holbrook has done specifically that which Firemaster 
suggests he should have done, and his request was erroneously 
denied by the Trial Court. There was no waiver by Mr. Holbrook. 
There was only a denial by the Trial Court and therefore this 
appeal request for rectification of that error is appropriate. 
Next, Firemaster argues that the $50,000 award, which 
Firemaster seeks to have vacated, has compensated Mr. Holbrook for 
his accounting fees. This is a meritless argument for the 
following reasons. 
By stipulation of the parties, no evidence of Mr. 
Holbrook's accounting fees were ever submitted to the Jury, (Tr. 
at R. 429 6-97) so it is impossible to say that the Jury took into 
account Mr. Miller's fees in making the $50,000 award to Mr. 
Holbrook. A review of Firemaster's argument on this issue clearly 
shows no reference in the record to Mr. Miller's accounting fees 
until the post trial motions were made. (R. 3143-3354). Where the 
jury had no evidence of Mr. Miller's fees, argument by Firemaster 
that they were part of the $50,000 award is totally meritless. 
In fact, the $158,206 paid by Mr. Holbrook for Paragraph 
8 services that he testified to at Trial also did not contain the 
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amount of Mr. Miller's accounting fees. (R. 4521, 5668; Plaintiff's 
Trial Exhibits 11 & 34). Firemaster has shown no place in the 
record where the Jury was provided Mr. Miller's fees, because such 
a reference does not exist. For that reason, Firemaster's argument 
that the award of the accounting fees would present a double 
recovery has no basis in fact or in the record. 
Finally, Firemaster's third argument (converse to its 
previous argument) admits the truth, which is that Mr. Miller's 
accounting fees were not submitted as evidence to the jury. 
Firemaster claims that this defect makes any award of such fees 
impossible. However, by stipulation of the parties both sides 
agreed to submit their costs and attorneys' fees to the Court post-
trial based upon the their view of the final findings of the Jury 
(Tr. at R. 4296-97). 
After trial, Mr. Holbrook did request of this Court Mr. 
Miller's accounting fees and the Court had the evidence before it. 
(R. 3343-3349). Therefore, while the Jury did not receive evidence 
of Mr. Miller's costs and fees, the Trial Court did have the 
opportunity to award those fees to Mr. Holbrook under his requests 
for post trial relief. (R. 3143-3354). The denial of such requests 
is part of Mr. Holbrook's appeal. The awarding of Mr. Miller's 
fees is an appropriate remedy for the Trial Court's failure to 
grant Mr. Holbrook's well founded motion for an accounting. (R. 
974-991, 1060-1298; 1419-1435). 
In denying Mr. Holbrook's motion for an accounting, the 
Trial Court ignored the obvious structure of the relationship 
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between the parties set up by Firemaster wherein it received all 
revenues and was paid, under contracts it drafted, to account for 
such revenues. (See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, 
Section 8). No material question of fact ever existed on the 
following issues either before trial or after: 
A. Firemaster drafted all the contracts. 
B. The contracts required Firemaster to receive all proceeds 
from all sales and services Mr. Holbrook performed. (Plaintiff's 
Trial Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, Section 8). 
C. All sales and services performed on accoimt were assigned 
to Firemaster (for examples see the lower left corner of 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 113, 114, 115, 116). 
D. Firemaster required all the documentation from sales and 
services by Mr. Holbrook to be maintained by Firemaster, and kept 
such documentation locked up. (Tr. at R. 4700-4703). 
E. Mr. Holbrook paid Firemaster substantial revenues, up to 
47% of each sale under contracts prepared by Firemeister, to perform 
accounting services for Mr. Holbrook. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 
1, 2, and 3, Section 8). 
Firemaster had possession and control of all funds and 
documents. Firemaster was paid handsomely to account. (See 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34). Yet the Trial Court did 
not require Firemaster to pay for a fair and impartial accounting. 
Mr. Holbrook had to pay Firemaster for accounting services for two 
and one-half years. Then Mr. Holbrook had to pay Mr. Miller to 
review and analyze what Firemaster did. Mr. Holbrook proved 
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Firemaster tortiously converted his funds, breached all the 
contracts and did so in bad faith. (R. at 2729-2737, 2743-47, 
2759-62) See addendum hereto, Exhibit B. Yet the Trial Court did 
not require Mr. Holbrook to be reimbursed for Mr. Miller's 
substantial and expensive work. (See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 22-
32, 101-4182, and Tr. at R. 4768-4781, 5258-5279). 
The acceptance of the Section 8 responsibilities of the 
contracts by Firemaster, and its actual possession of all the 
funds, created a duty in Firemaster to fairly and accurately 
account for the cash and receivables of the parties. See Simper v. 
Scorup, 1 P.2d 1941 (Utah 1931); Keeble v. Brown, et. al, 266 P.2d 
569 (Col. 1954); Towers v. Titus, et. al. , 5 B.R. 786 (N.D. Cal. 
1979); and Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, et. al., 489 F. Supp. 354 
(Utah 1977). The case of Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 237 P.2d 656 
(Calif. 1951) also supports this position. Firemaster demanded the 
funds by contracts it drafted. It just hates having the associated 
duties. The jury recognized this in finding a fiduciary duty on 
the part of Firemaster and in assessing conversion and punitive 
damages against Firemaster. (Addendum, Exhibit B). 
In the extent case, Firemaster gladly, by contracts it 
prepared, took on the duties of accounting and was paid well to do 
so. The reality and substance of the relationship between the 
parties clearly overrides any generalized argument by Firemaster 
that no duty to account existed. Firemaster had the paperwork, the 
funds and was paid to account. Firemaster had a solemn 
responsibility which it was found by a trier of fact to have 
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violated. The facts regarding those duty issues have always been 
uncontroverted. The only thing controverted was Firemaster's 
desire to be held to account and the results of an accounting. No 
genuine issue of fact has ever existed on any of the material 
issues. This Court must find Firemaster had the legal duty to 
account when it had the cash, the paperwork and was paid to 
account. To provide Mr. Holbrook the minimal offset of his fees 
incurred for hiring an outside accountant is the minimum award that 
Mr. Holbrook should receive as a result of Firemaster's breaches 
of it's duties to him. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FIREMASTER'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS MR. HOLBROOK'S STATE AND FEDERAL RACKETEERING CLAIMS. 
A. Firemaster stated on pgs. 26-27 of it's Brief: 
"Although the Franchisor concedes that the Trial court's 
decision to dismiss the racketeering claim solely on the 
choice of law provision is not, by itself, defensible." 
Based upon this statement by Firemaster and the arguments 
set forth in the first brief of Mr. Holbrook on this issue, it is 
unquestioned that the decision to dismiss Mr. Holbrook's 
racketeering claims by the Trial Court should be reversed and 
remanded for a trial on such issues. 
Firemaster seeks to remedy the erroneous legal decision 
by the Trial Court by setting forth in its reply the same arguments 
that were rejected below. (R. 198-221, 560-582, 713-737A, 811-841, 
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844-852, 1458-1481, 1529-159 6, 1606-1617, 1618-1620, 162 6-1638, 
1671-1674). 
Firemaster sets forth on Pages 2 6 through 28 of it's 
brief a generalized argument of the law concerning pleading 
racketeering. These arguments were not persuasive for the Trial 
Court. (R. 1671-74, see addendum hereto, Exhibit C). In fact, 
these arguments of Firemaster were specifically rejected by Judge 
Brian by his deletion of those grounds from the order prepared by 
counsel for Firemaster. (R. 1673). 
Mr. Holbrook set forth in his Second Amended Complaint 
multiple specific allegations of wrong-doing by Firemaster and it's 
individual officers and employees under two separate racketeering 
causes of action which were dismissed on the same grounds. (R. 
1332-1365). 
The allegation's in the Second Amended Complaint set 
forth by Mr. Holbrook were sufficient for the Jury in this case to 
find Firemaster had breached it's contracts and fiduciary duty to 
Mr. Holbrook, that Firemaster had done so in bad faith, that it 
had tortiously converted his funds and justified the imposition of 
punitive damages. (Addendum, Exhibit B) . Tortious conversion of 
money is clearly the civil version of theft, a viable and valid 
racketeering charge. 
Yet for some reason, when the rules of procedure require 
applying a supposedly lesser standard of burden of proof relating 
to pleadings than that which a jury must meet, the Trial Court 
apparently construed the pleadings against Mr. Holbrook (the 
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respondent) and in favor of Firemaster (the petitioner). The lower 
Court could not find for Firemaster on the substantive racketeering 
arguments, despite all it's attempts to cause specific dismissal 
of Mr. Holbrook's racketeering claims for the arguments set forth 
by Firemaster in its Appeal brief. Instead, the Trial Court chose 
a basis for dismissal that Firemaster itself now admits is not 
defensible. 
The lower court tacitly admitted that Mr. Holbrook's 
allegations were well pled because it chose to dismiss the 
racketeering claims on the very narrow grounds that are now 
admittedly not defensible and did not dismiss them on the specific 
grounds as now argued by Firemaster. (R. 1673) (Addendum, Exhibit 
C). Where the Trial Court did not dismiss the racketeering claims 
on the specific grounds argued now by Firemaster, this Court 
cannot, in effect, grant a motion not before it by upholding an 
order for different grounds than found below. The narrow "out" 
argued by Firemaster from the case of Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 
1057 (Utah App. 1990) is not applicable here. No other valid 
grounds for dismissal existed, either before or now. This error 
should be rectified by a reversal of the Trial Court's order and 
a remand for further proceedings. 
B. Firemaster replied with a generalized argument 
concerning pleading racketeering with particularity without 
reference to any specific section of the Plaintiff's Second Amended 
Complaint to show how or why the allegations therein were not 
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sufficiently pled with particularity. Mr. Holbrook does not deny 
the generalized legal theory espoused by Firemaster in its 
argument. Firemaster's problem is, the Second Amended Complaint 
contains an overabundance of particulars, and Firemaster has not 
addressed any. Without Firemaster identifying issues allegedly not 
sufficiently particularized, it is not possible to respond with 
particularity to its argument. It should be sufficient to note 
that Firemaster made the same argument regarding particularity 
regarding Mr. Holbrook's fraud claim, but ended up dropping that 
argument regarding the Second Amended Complaint, clearly because 
of the abundance of particulars. (R. at 1458-81). 
C. Firemaster claims that the necessary "enterprise" 
was not alleged by Mr. Holbrook. In so doing, Firemaster is simply 
ignoring the obvious facts and law. 
As set forth in the Second Amended Complaint (R. 1332, 
1357), and in the arguments of Mr. Holbrook in opposition to 
Firemaster's motion to dismiss in the trial court (R. 1532-37), 
Mr. Holbrook and his business is cited as the enterprise necessary 
for a racketeering claim. Firemaster's only address of this issue 
comes on Page 31 of it's brief where it discounts, without any 
support, the Plaintiff as the enterprise. Firemaster does not 
anywhere show why Mr. Holbrook cannot be the enterprise under Utah 
Code Annotated Section 76-10-1602(1). 
The enterprise is Mr. Holbrook in his independent 
contractor area and franchise territories as set forth in 
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Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit's "1", "2", and "3". As in the case of 
Jacobsen v. Cooper, 882 F.2d 717 (2nd Cir. 1989), the court 
indicated the Plaintiff had alleged a sufficient enterprise when 
he stated that the enterprise consisted of his own real estate 
investment and development company. See also Haroco v. American 
National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 767 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984). 
Mr. Holbrook's business had an ascertainable structure and 
organization based upon contracts drafted specifically by 
Firemaster. Mr. Holbrook is the enterprise and this issue is 
adequately pled by him. 
D. Mr. Holbrook more than adequately pled a pattern of 
unlawful activity. 
Mr. Holbrook both pled and presented evidence at Trial 
of in excess of 1,000 instances where commissions were taken away 
from him by Firemaster through an intentional pattern of taking. 
(See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 101-4182). A jury has already 
found that taking to constitute tortious conversion of the funds 
of Mr. Holbrook, justifying the imposition of punitive damages. 
(Addendum, Exhibit B) 
In it's argument on this issue, Firemaster only generally 
alleges there is no pattern stated, but ignores the proven facts 
of this case and the case of State v. McGrath 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 
1988), which indicates that each particular sale of illegal drugs 
constituted a separate criminal episode for purposes of meeting 
the requisite pattern of a racketeering claim. Only three episodes 
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are needed to meet the racketeering pleading requirements. Mr. 
Holbrook pled over 150 specific instances of alleged unlawful 
activity by providing the date, amount and account involved 
regarding the specific unlawful activity. Such references are 
clearly sufficient to meet the "pattern" requirement based upon 
State v. McGrath, supra law for purposes of pleading racketeering. 
Mr. Holbrook clearly proved a sufficient "pattern" of 
unlawful activity to convince a Jury that Firemaster was engaged 
in tortious conversion of his commissions on a consistent, 
systematic basis over a two and one-half year period of time. The 
pleading of such "pattern" also meets the requirements of the 
Sedima, S.P.R.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). That case 
indicates the factor of continuity plus relationship combining to 
produce a pattern is what must exist for racketeering claims. This 
is supported by the case of H. J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). 
The specific instances of taking pled in the Plaintiff's 
Second Amended Complaint, (R. 1332-1365) clearly set forth a 
specific pattern of unlawful activity wherein Firemaster 
consistently, over time, took ever increasing amounts of Mr. 
Holbrook's funds from the commissions he earned while associated 
with Firemaster. (See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 22-32, 101-4182). 
Firemaster has done nothing to explain how the illegal taking of 
commissions in over 1,000 specific instances, over a two and one-
half year period, which was only stopped since Mr. Holbrook 
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terminated his relationship with Firemaster, fails to constitute 
a pattern having continuity plus relationship. 
The relationship is that all funds were handled by 
Firemaster's accounting department, as part of it's process to 
collect the income it desired (as contrasted to what it was 
entitled to), that Firemaster was paid to account and that it 
consistently wrongfully took excess commissions as testified to by 
the various witnesses in the Trial. For the purpose of making 
pleading requirements, these were sufficiently set forth in the 
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (R. 1332-1365). 
All Firemaster's arguments against Mr. Holbrook's 
racketeering claims are generally accurate statements about 
racketeering law, but completely ignore the vast number of 
specifics provided in the well-pled allegations of the Plaintiff's 
Second Amended Complaint. (R. 1332-1365). The facts are clear. 
Firemaster knows the law, it just (as found by the Jury) decided 
not to abide by the law. 
This Court must find the Trial Court clearly erred in 
dismissing Mr. Holbrook's racketeering claims, must reverse that 
decision and the associated award of attorneys fees, and must 
remand for further proceedings. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE PLAINTIFF 
TO PUT ON EVIDENCE AT TRIAL OF LOST PROFITS INCURRED AS A 
RESULT OF THE WRONGFUL IMPOSITION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNC-
TION AND/OR ALTERNATIVELY TO PERMIT SUCH A DETERMINATION AS 
PART OF MR. HOLBROOK'S POST-TRIAL MOTIONS FOR RELIEF. 
12 
The substantive issue regarding lost profits in this case 
centers on whether the preliminary injunction was wrongfully 
entered. At paragraph 139 of Mr. Holbrook's second amended 
complaint, he provided notice of a claim for damages relative to 
the injunction (R. 1369). The Trial Court still refused Mr. 
Holbrook to put on evidence of his lost profits. (Tr. at R. 5305-
5310). 
The reason Mr. Holbrook lost profits was because 
Firemaster obtained from the Trial Court an injunction that kept 
him from working certain accounts after this litigation began. (R. 
740-745, 1600-1603). Had there been no injunction requested by 
Firemaster, Mr. Holbrook could have mitigated his damages. There 
was no surprise on this issue. The Trial Court totally failed to 
explain the basis of how the injunction was not wrongfully entered, 
given the jury verdicts finding that Mr. Holbrook fully performed 
his contracts until he terminated in January of 1990 (R. 2729-37). 
The case of Cohn v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 537 P.2d 
306 (Utah 1975) clearly holds that damages such as lost profits, 
which clearly and obviously flow from a wrong need not be pled 
specifically. No clearer situation could exist for lost profits 
than Firemaster obtaining a court order to keep Mr. Holbrook from 
working. Mr. Holbrook complied with the Court's order and did not 
work the accounts which were the subject of the injunction. He now 
is penalized for his compliance with the Court's order by its 
refusal to either award him damages or permit consideration of 
damages for not working such accounts. 
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The Trial Court should have followed the result of the 
case of Wright v. West Side Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990) 
where the Trial Court correctly applied the law to the facts by 
recognizing the prior breaches of the agreement between the parties 
justified the non-breaching party from performing further under 
such contract, and terminating any further obligation to perform 
by the aggrieved party. See also Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
It is the duty of the jury to find facts and the Court 
to apply the law. Briaham v. Moon Lake Elec. Assoc, 470 P.2d 393 
(Utah 1970). The Court should have reviewed the special jury 
verdicts and as a matter of law should have resolved the crucial 
inconsistencies based upon Mr. Holbrook's clear and complete 
contract performance over two and one-half years. Had the Trial 
Court correctly done so, Mr. Holbrook would have been permitted to 
have either the Judge or Jury consider his request for lost profits 
because the wrongfulness of the injunction would be clear. 
The Trial Court failed to apply the law to correctly 
resolve the affairs between these parties leaving Mr. Holbrook to 
still be responsible, after January of 1990, to Firemaster in some 
respects, after all its intentionally tortious acts toward him. 
Once the unquestioned chronology of the facts in this case and the 
law have been correctly applied to eliminate each and every further 
obligation on the part of Mr. Holbrook to perform under the 
contracts after January of 1990, the decision of the Trial Court 
that the injunction was not wrongfully entered becomes clearly 
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erroneous and must be reversed. Such a conclusion will thereby 
justify an award of damages based upon Mr. Holbrook's pleading set 
forth at paragraph 139 of the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint 
(R. 1369-70); upon Mr. Holbrook's request for post trial relief (R. 
3198-3201) or a remand for further proceedings on this issue. 
4. THE AWARD TO MR. HOLBROOK OF ONLY $5,872.36 IN PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHERE THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED 
TO PERMIT EVIDENCE OF FIREMASTER'S NET WORTH TO GO TO THE 
JURY. 
Firemaster argues the failure to submit evidence of the 
financial net worth of Firemaster to the Jury is fatal to Mr. 
Holbrook's claim for recovery of any additional punitive damages. 
Mr. Holbrook sought to have that financial information submitted 
to the Jury. Firemaster objected and the Court sustained the 
objection. (Tr. at R. 5442-5443). 
The Court did make a statement the information could be 
considered at a later time (R. 5443). However, there was no later 
time provided by the Court and the special Jury Verdict form that 
was approved by both sides and the Court went to the Jury with the 
authorization to the Jury to award punitive damages without further 
instruction by the Court or further evidence. (R. 2743-2745). 
Where Mr. Holbrook sought to have the financial statement 
of Firemaster admitted and was denied that right by the Court, 
based upon the objection of Firemaster, it is clearly prejudicial 
at this time to say that the Jury did not have such evidence based 
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on the failure of Mr. Holbrook to submit it. He attempted to do 
so and was denied that right by the Court as set forth above. 
What really happened, as recognized by the Trial Court 
in it's statements in post-trial motions (Tr. at R.5794-5803), was 
that the parties and the Court permitted the Special Jury Verdicts 
authorizing an award of punitive damages to go to the Jury without 
the bifurcation as required under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-
18-1 (1) and (2). This statutory procedure was not clearly 
delineated or followed by the Court and parties, resulting in an 
award of punitive damages that does not reflect the Jury's proper 
considerations of all material issues. See e.g. Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), Bundy v. Century Equipment 
Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) and Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 
(Utah 1985). 
When his issue was argued below, the Trial Court 
correctly addressed the problem. (Tr. at R. 5797-5803) 
The only realistic solution is for a new trial to proceed 
on the issue as to what is the correct amount of punitive damages. 
See Bundv, supra. Firemaster's only argument on this subject is 
that such an approach is impractical and a waste of judicial time. 
Had Firemaster permitted the financial evidence to go to 
a jury in the prior trial, a new trial might not be required. It 
was Firemaster and the Trial Court that chose to defer 
consideration of the financial condition of Firemaster to a later 
date if an award of punitive damages was found to be appropriate. 
Such an award was found to be appropriate. The Jury received a 
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special verdict form approved by all the parties and the Court that 
instructed them to proceed to award punitive damages (R. 2743-
2745). 
Without correction of this error no permissible punitive 
damage award to Plaintiff based on the evidence will exist in this 
case. While judicial economy may be important, error that was 
created in large part by the defendant and the Court, should not 
be the basis for denying a Plaintiff his right to receive the 
correct amount of damages awardable by a fact finder. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING MR. HOLBROOK'S 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOV, AND/OR MOTION FOR 
DECLARATORY RELIEF, STRIKING THE JURY VERDICT TO FIREMASTER 
FOR BREACH OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACTS. 
The key issue in this entire case, that will resolve a 
myriad of the problems argued by both sides, is how a person such 
as Mr. Holbrook must act relative to contracts, when he has fully 
performed them for two and one-half years, and then discovers the 
other party has been repeatedly intentionally and willfully 
breaching such contracts during the same period of time. 
Firemaster argues that Mr. Holbrook should have ongoing obligations 
of confidentiality because the contracts were divisible on the 
issues of Firemaster's duties versus Mr. Holbrook's duties. 
The jury specifically answered this issue by finding the 
obligations of Mr. Holbrook should be terminated and he should not 
be required to perform further because of Firemaster's actions (R. 
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2759-60, Addendum, Exhibit B). The Court agreed separately after 
trial (R. 4844-46). 
The jury also found Mr. Holbrook fully performed his 
obligations under the contracts until the time he terminated his 
relationship with Firemaster (R. 2729-37). The chronology of this 
case falls entirely and completely in Mr. Holbrook's favor. The 
accounting exhibits and testimony of Mr. Miller clearly establish 
the willful conversion by Firemaster (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 
22-32, 101-4182, Tr. at R. 4768-81, 5258-79). 
The issue the Court left unresolved, is whether, as a 
matter of law, Firemaster could continue to require Mr. Holbrook's 
performance on his contractual obligations of confidentiality. 
This was an issue of law for the Court to decide. It did so decide 
only after a fashion. (R. 3890-91). Because the Trial Court did 
not deal with the issues which were part of the above referenced 
motions denied by the Trial Court, this is now an appeal issue. 
Firemaster claims that the obligations under the 
contracts were divisible. Firemaster still seeks, because the 
Trial Court did not clarify the obligations of the parties by 
striking the award of damages to Firemaster, to retain some right 
to compensation from Mr. Holbrook under contracts Firemaster 
repeatedly (over 1,000 times), intentionally violated. Such a 
result should not be tolerated by the Courts of this state. See 
Wright and Kinsman, supra. 
This case provides a crystal clear fact situation. Two 
specific time periods are involved. Mr. Holbrook fully performed 
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his obligations under the contracts from June of 1987 through 
January of 1990. No evidence exists to the contrary and the jury 
so found. (R. 2729-37). After January of 1990, Mr. Holbrook 
became not a franchisee, but a competitor, of Firemaster. The 
question that remains is, can Firemaster do what the jury found it 
to have done, and still require Mr. Holbrook to perform his duties 
under the contracts after January of 1990. The Kinsman and Wright, 
supra, cases say no. They say such a result will not be tolerated. 
This Holbrook v. Master Protection case should say the same and Mr. 
Holbrook's appeal on this issue should be upheld. If that occurs, 
most other issues in this appeal then can be made consistent and 
sensible. 
6. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD MR. 
HOLBROOK HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY 
IN THIS ACTION AND UNDER THE STANDARDS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 78-27-56. 
If the threshold question as set forth by Mr. Holbrook 
is properly decided,1 then the $10,000 award and the equitable 
payment to Firemaster will be vacated, and it becomes clear Mr. 
Holbrook is the prevailing party in this litigation. Without such 
a decision, this case may present a "mixed bag" of results. 
Firemaster's entire reply argument on this issue is that 
the results of the case constitute such a "mixed bag" of results, 
the prevailing party cannot be identified. By answering correctly 
And if Mr. Holbrook prevails on his appeal regarding the 
racketeering claims, thus vacating the attorneys fee award to 
Firemaster. 
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the threshold question of Mr. Holbrook's duties after January 30, 
1990, the "mixed bag" theory of Firemaster is answered and rejected 
in full. Firemaster has provided the Court and Jury with adequate 
grounds for them to find that it acted in a willful and malicious 
manner in the tortious taking of Mr. Holbrook's commissions. A 
correction of the lower court's errors on these issues would 
resolve all questions concerning the prevailing party in this 
action. 
Firemaster's actions in refusing to account to Mr. 
Holbrook, in failing to ever pay for a fair and impartial 
accounting, in failing to ever present in court that such an 
accounting was done, its lack of good faith found by the fury and 
the finding of conversion of Mr. Holbrook's assets is sufficient 
evidence, under the standard of Cady v. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149 (Utah 
1983) regarding fraud and wrong-doing, to award Mr. Holbrook his 
fees under Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56. 
Firemaster's actions as found by the jury (Addendum, 
Exhibit B hereto), are sufficient to award Mr. Holbrook his fees 
and costs under the contracts, if the threshold question as stated 
by Mr. Holbrook is properly answered. 
A failure by this Court to award costs and attorneys' 
fees against Firemaster is in fact a victory for Firemaster and 
will permit Firemaster in the future to steal their other 
franchisees' commissions, knowing that it can economically outlast 
such parties throughout the Court process without ever risking 
having to pay their victims' attorneys' fees. The failure to award 
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costs and attorneys' fees to Mr* Holbrook in this case grants 
Firemaster a license of impunity to willfully and maliciously steal 
commissions from it's independent contractors and franchisees. 
This Court must not permit such a result. Firemaster must pay Mr. 
Holbrook's costs and attorneys' fees. 
7. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING MR. HOLBROOK TO 
PAY $11,014.00 IN CASH AS AN "EQUITABLE" PAYMENT TO FIREMASTER 
FOR ACCESS TO THE CONFIDENTIAL CUSTOMER LIST WHERE MR. 
HOLBROOK WAS FOUND TO HAVE FULLY PERFORMED HIS OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER THE CONTRACTS. 
Firemaster admits that the "equitable" payment imposed 
by the Court was erroneous (page 21 of it's brief), wherein it 
stated: 
"Charitably stated, the Trial Court's action was 
unorthodox and unsolicited. At a minimum, the Trial 
Court should be required to explain why it applied a 
remedy that neither party requested...." 
Mr. Holbrook asserts that the Court need not explain. 
The issue is simply so erroneous that it must be vacated because 
there is no justification for it, in fact or in law. 
Once the threshold issue of Mr. Holbrook's ongoing 
obligations under the contracts after two and one-half years of 
fully performing his obligations and after Firemaster's two and 
one-half years of intentional breaches, is answered by dismissing 
any and all further obligations by Mr. Holbrook under the contracts 
after January of 1990, the issue of equitable relief to Firemaster 
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of any kind is clearly answered, i.e. it deserves none. Even 
without answering the threshold question, that issue is already 
clearly answered by virtue of findings of the jury that Firemaster 
willfully and maliciously tortiously converted the funds of Mr. 
Holbrook. Equity cannot protect such a party. 
See the case of Battistone v. American Land and 
Development Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980) which indicates that a 
court of equity will generally not assist one in extricating 
himself from circumstances which he has created. (See pg. 839). 
Firemaster put itself in the position where Mr. Holbrook could no 
longer bear their tortious taking of his commissions and therefore 
made him their competitor. A court of equity should not assist 
Firemaster by providing it relief based upon circumstances 
Firemaster itself created. 
The case Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980) indicates that prior to a party receiving equitable relief 
it must exercise reasonable efforts to discharge it's own 
obligation. Where there are clear findings of fact that Firemaster 
failed to discharge it's obligations during the time period of June 
1987 through January 1990, under the well settled law in the 
Bradford, supra case, Firemaster has been found not to have 
discharged it's duties and is therefore not entitled to equitable 
relief from this Court. See also the case of Parks Enterprises, 
Inc. v. New Century Reality, Inc., 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982). 
January of 1990 is an absolute cut-off date of Mr. 
Holbrook's obligations to Firemaster. In order to bring legal 
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clarity to the manner in which parties must relate to each other 
in these type of contractual and business situations, this Court 
must enter a clear and unequivocable statement indicating that once 
a party has materially breached the contracts and tortiously 
damaged the other party to it's business or contractual relations, 
the injured party need not further perform and is justified in no 
further performance of any of the contractual obligations. If one 
side ignores the contract, the other need not follow it either. 
Therefore, this award to Firemaster of $11,014.00 must be vacated. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Holbrook urges this Court to make sense for him of 
the key issue of how he should act when he has honored his 
contracts for two and one-half years, and then proved Firemaster 
intentionally and willfully converted his commissions during the 
entire time period. Mr. Holbrook honored his contracts. The jury 
found this to be the case. Firemaster wrongfully breached the 
contracts, repeatedly and intentionally. 
Mr. Holbrook's actions over time respectfully deserve 
this Court's assistance in awarding him all appropriate relief and 
in punishing Firemaster. 
Mr. Holbrook deserves this Court to tell him he had no 
obligation to Firemaster after January of 1990 because of 
Firemaster's actions and to vacate any relief to Firemaster on 
actions after that date that related to the contracts. 
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Mr. Holbrook deserves this Court to reverse errors 
regarding the racketeering claims, punitive damages and the $11,014 
award which the Court and opposing party have admitted were in 
error. Mr. Holbrook respectfully requests this Court's assistance 
in rectifying all these clear and prejudicial errors. 
DATED this /bf^day of -feja^q*—f , 199 3. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ICHARD N. BIGELOW 9 ^=" R
Attorney for Cross-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT to the following on this 16th day of 
February, 1993. 
John T. Anderson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
"$JUf • 6i 
holbrook.rep 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A 
Mel S. Martin (Bar No. 21C2) 
Richard N. Bigelow (Bar Nc. 2?:-: 
MARTIN & BIGELOW, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
900 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7332 
IN THE THIRD JZ'ZZCZJ-JL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LA*Z CZT.~£
 f STATE OF UTAH 
BARD N. HOLBROOK, ~PGMENT ON COMPLAINT 
:r PLAINTIFF 
Civil No. 900900445CN 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
an individual, and JOHN DOES 
1-20. 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Pat 
B. Brian on February 4, 1991. Plaimiff appeared by and through 
his attorney Richard N. Bigelcv cf Xarrin & Bigelow, P.C. 
Defendants appeared by and thrcugi rheir attorney, John T. 
Anderson of Parsons, Behle & Lariner. 
After a jury was enpanelei and opening statements made, 
testimony and other evidence were imrcduced in support of the 
respective cases of the parties. 
The Court submitted Plaimiff fs claims for breach of 
the three contracts between the parties, for fraud, for 
conversion, for breach of fiduciary iu-y, for negligent 
misrepresentation, for unjust enriciirar:-, for violations of 
OCT 0 3 1991 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MASTER PROTECTION CORPORATION, 
dba FIREMASTER, California 
Corporation, ROBIN PHILLIPS, 
California Corporation's Code § 31Z35 er ssq., fcr quasi 
contract, for breach of the implied ccvenan- cf good faith and 
fair dealing and other special verdicrs regarding Plaintiff's 
defenses to Defendant Firemaster's ciains re rhe jury and 
submitted Defendants' counterclaims azair.sr Plair.riff for 
improper interference with contractual reiariens, with breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, for 
conversion and for breach of the cenfidentialiry provisions of 
the written agreements to the jury, Afrer rhe parties rested and 
closing arguments were made, the jury, having been instructed 
upon all matters of law and having rehired re deliberate upon its 
verdict, did thereafter on February 12, 1931, rerurn to the Court 
special verdicts which are attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
After trial, additional issues were submitted to the 
Court and resolved as set forth in orders cf rhe Court dated 
April 8, 1991, and thereafter. 
It appears that all clains bervsen rie parties have 
been resolved and the matter now coming en fcr judgment upon the 
following verdict, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as fcllcvs: 
1. On Plaintiff's First Cause cf Azrrion for breach of 
the Territory Agreement, Plaintiff shall be, and he hereby is, 
granted judgment against Defendant Firenasrer in the principal 
sum of $5,889.35, plus interest at the rare cf 12% per annum from 
the date of entry of this judgment to the dare cf payment. 
2. Regarding Plaintiff's claim for breach of the 
Franchise Agreement No, 1 regarding the Salt Lake City area, 
Plaintiff shall be, and hereby is, granted judgment against 
Defendant Firemaster in the principal sum of $1,00, plus interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry of this 
judgment to the date of payment. 
3. On Plaintiff's claim for breach of the Franchise 
Agreement No. 2 for the Rural Utah Franchise, Plaintiff shall be, 
and hereby is, granted a judgment against Defendant Firemaster 
for breach of contract in the principal sum of $1.00, plus 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry of 
this judgment to the date of payment. 
4. Plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees and costs 
associated with this proceeding is denied. 
5. On Plaintiff's claim regarding fraud against 
Defendant Firemaster and Defendant Robin Phillips, Defendant 
Firemaster and Defendant Robin D. Phillips shall be, and hereby 
are, granted a judgment of no cause of action against Plaintiff. 
6. On Plaintiff's cause of action for conversion, 
Plaintiff shall be, and hereby is, granted judgment against 
Defendant Firemaster in the principal sum of $30,032.71, and for 
punitive damages in the amount of $5,872,36, plus interest at the 
rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry of this judgment to 
the date of payment. 
7. Regarding Plaintiff's claim for breach of Defendant 
Firemaster's fiduciary responsibility, Plaintiff shall be, and he 
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hereby is, granted judgnenr agams- Defendant Firemaster in the 
principal sum of $1.00, plus interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum from the date of entry cf rhis judgment to the date of 
payment. 
8. Regarding Plaincifffs claim of negligent 
misrepresentation by Defendant Firenasrer, Defendant Firemaster 
shall be, and it hereby is, granred a judgment of no cause of 
action against the Plaintiff. 
9. Regarding Plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment by 
Defendant Firemaster, Defendant Firenaster shall be, and it 
hereby is, granted a judgment cf nc cause of action against the 
Plaintiff. 
10. Regarding Plaintiff's claim of breach of 
California Corporation Code § 31CI5 et seq., by Defendant 
Firemaster, Defendant Firenasrer snail be, and it hereby is, 
granted a judgment of no cause cf action against the Plaintiff. 
11. Regarding Plaintiff's claim of breach of Quasi 
Contract against Defendant Fireziasrer, Defendant Firemaster shall 
be, and it hereby is, granted a judgment of no cause of action 
against the Plaintiff. 
12. On Plaintiff's claijn against Defendant Firemaster 
for breach of the Implied Ccvenan- of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing, Plaintiff shall be, and hereby is, granted a judgment 
against Defendant Firemaster in a principal sum of $50,000.00, 
plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry 
of this judgment to the date cf paynen~. 
13. Defendant Firemaster is granted judgment that 
Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was not forced to enter into the two 
Franchise Agreements under duress. 
14. Plaintiff Bard Holbrook is granted judgment that 
Defendant Firemaster's actions regarding the payment of 
commissions bars Defendant Firemaster from being able to enforce 
the non-competition and liquidated damages provisions of the 
contracts between the parties. 
15. Plaintiff Bard Holbrook is granted judgment that 
the consideration the Plaintiff was to receive under the 
contracts between the parties failed, thereby terminating his 
obligations under such contracts. 
16. Plaintiff Bard Holbrook is granted judgment that 
Defendant Firemaster waived its rights to require Plaintiff Bard 
Holbrook to perform his obligations under the Territory Agreement 
and Franchise Contracts as a result of Defendant Firemaster's 
failure to pay commissions and provide services as set forth in 
those contracts. 
17. Plaintiff Bard Holbrook is granted judgment that 
Defendant Firemaster's prior failure to perform its obligations 
under the contracts justified Plaintiff's refusal to continue to 
perform under such contracts. 
18. Defendant Firemaster shall be and hereby is, 
granted judgment against Plaintiff Bard Holbrook of no liability 
to Plaintiff on the cash bond of $75,000.00 filed in connection 
with the injunction in this case. 
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19, Plaintiff shall be and hereby is, granted a 
Declaratory judgment against Defendant Firemaster in that 
Plaintiff is and has been lawfully excused from any further 
performance under the contracts entered into between Plaintiff 
and Defendant Firemaster except as specifically set forth 
otherwise by the Orders of this Court. 
20. Defendant Firemaster's and Defendant Robin 
Phillips' other claims for attorney fees and costs other than 
those associated with their defense of Plaintiff's racketeering 
claims associated with this action are denied. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all 
other claims between the parties not specifically described 
herein are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this
 v*? day of //Q (6 £ ^ . , 1991. 
BY THE COl 
HONORABLE PAT BT-BR"I" 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
02C9SX 
OCT 0 3 1991 
JOHN T. ANDERSCN' ::.:; 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE S LJ-.ZZXEP. 
Attorneys for Cefer.da-ts X==-=r Protection 
Corporation and Rcrir. 2. Phillies 
201 South Main Street, Suiie is:: 
P.O. Box 11893 
Salt Lake City, U-ah =414"-:HI 
Telephone: (3C1) 5J2-i:24 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 2ZSZ7.ZCZ COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
] JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM 
; CF DEFENDANT, MASTER 
PROTECTION CORPORATION, 
D3A FIREMASTER 
MASTER PROTECTION CCPPCPAIIC.V ; Civil No. 900900445CN 
dba FIREMASTER, a California 
corporation; ROBIJr D. PHILLIPS; ; Judge Pat B. Brian 
and JOHN DOES 1-2 J, 
Defer.iar.rs. \ 
A jury rrial ir. rrs aicve-captioned case was conducted 
on February 4, through Feir-ar*' 12, 1991, before the undersigned. 
The court having suinrred re rha jury by way of four special 
verdict forms four cf rhe olaizos contained in the counterclaim of 
defendant, Master Prcrscricr Corporation, dba Firemaster 
("Firemaster") , and rhe jury having completed each of the special 
verdict forms, ar.o gocd cause appearing for the entry of a judg-
ment formally enicdymo rhe jury's special verdicts on 
Firemaster's ccunrerclaizis, ir is hereby 
0-^385 
BARD N. H0LBR0CK 
.Plair.riff, 
vs. 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Firemaster shall be, and it hereby is, granted 
judgment against plaintiff and counterclaim defendant, Bard N. 
Holbrook ("Holbrook") on Firemaster's claim that Holbrook 
breached the confidentiality provisions of that certain territory 
agreement dated June 30, 1987, that certain trade secret agree-
ment dated July 11, 1987, and those two certain franchise agree-
ments dated April 11, 1988 and that Holbrook is liable to 
Firemaster for liquidated damages in the principal sum of 
$10,000, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date 
of entry of this judgment to the date of payment, pursuant to 
paragraph 13(b) of the territory agreement and paragraph 14(c) of 
the franchise agreements. 
2. Firemaster shall be, and it hereby is, granted 
judgment against Holbrook on Firemaster's counterclaim for con-
version in the principal sum of $5,271.47, plus interest at the 
rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry of this judgment to 
the date of payment. 
3. Firemaster shall be, and it hereby is, granted 
judgment against Holbrook for attorneys' fees and costs in the 
amount of $8,124.50 incurred to defend against plaintiff's state 
law racketeering claims. 
4. Holbrook shall be, and he hereby is, granted a 
judgment of no cause of action against Firemaster on Firemaster's 
counterclaim for Holbrook's tortious interference with 
Firemaster's existing economic relations. 
5. Holbrook shall be, and he hereby is, granted judg-
ment of no cause of action against Firemaster on Firemaster's 
counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
6. Because the Court has previously determined that 
neither Firemaster nor Holbrook is the "prevailing party" for 
purposes of recovery of attorneys' fees and costs, each of the 
parties shall be, and they hereby are, directed to bear their own 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED this <^3 day of October, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT ON 
COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT MASTER PROTECTION CORPORATION, DBA 
FIREMASTER to the following on this ' day of October, 1991: 
Richard N. Bigelow, Esq. 
MARTIN & BIGELOW 
10 East South Temple, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
JTA/090491A 
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EXHIBIT 5 
Tfirro JL-WICIS! Dis J I C I 
FEB 1 2 1991 
SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINS 
FIREMASTER FOR BREACH OF THE TERRITORY AGREEMENT 
We the jury in the above entitled action, find the 
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to 
us: 
QUESTION NO, 1; Do you find that the territory agreement 
constituted a valid and enforceable agreement between the 
parties? 
Answer Yes or No. 
A n s w e r :
 - ^ 
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Do you find that the Plaintiff Bard Holbrook 
fully performed his obligations under the territory agreements 
prior to its termination? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: Uy^T 
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
(\ •'* * s', «-$ 
QUESTION NO. 3: Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was 
lawfully excused from performing any further obligations under 
the territory agreement? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: j^ J?5^  
0 
If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 3 "yes,11 then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 4 : Do you find that Defendant Firemaster 
wrongfully and without excuse or justification failed to pay 
Plaintiff Bard Holbrook the commissions and provide services set 
forth in Sections 4 and 8 of the territory agreement? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: ^ / T 
If you answer Question No. 4 lfnofff sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 5: Did Defendant Firemaster!s conduct cause 
Plaintiff Bard Holbrook to suffer damages which were reasonably 
foreseeable? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: L^\^ ; 
*"* /-* c- **~t r- r-* 
If you answer Question No. 5 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 5 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 6: What is the total amount of all damage suffered 
by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a result of Firemaster1s breaches 
of the Territory Agreement? 
Answer: $ T (?<f7, ?J 
DATED: 3-/>7/ ^ ^ - ^ ^ 
Forepers^ n^ 
SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST FIREMASTER 
FOR BREACH OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT NO. 1 
FOR THE SALT LAKE CITY AREA 
We the jury in the above entitled action, find the 
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to 
us: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Do you find that the Franchise Agreement No. 1 
for the Salt Lake City Area constituted a valid and enforceable 
agreement between the parties? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: (^Jpf 
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook fully 
performed his obligations under the Franchise Agreement No. 1 for 
the Salt Lake City Area prior to his termination with Defendant 
Firemaster? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: M ^ * 
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO, 3: Dc ycu find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was 
lawfully excused from performing any further obligations under 
the Franchise Agreement }o. 1 for the Salt Lake City area? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: ( */ J 
If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 4: Do ycu find that Defendant Firemaster wrongfully 
and without excuse or jusrification failed to pay Plaintiff Bard 
Holbrook the comnissicns and provide services set forth in 
Section 4 and 8 of the Franchise Agreement No. 1 for the Salt 
Lake City Area? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: &/- ? 
If you answer Question No. 4 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 5: Do you find that the Defendant Firemaster's 
wrongful, unjustified cr unexcused conduct caused Plaintiff Bard 
Holbrook to suffer damages which were reasonably foreseeable? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: i^£^ 
If you answer Question No. 5 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 5 "yes/1 then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 6; What is the total amount of all damage suffered 
by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a result of Firemaster"s breach of 
Franchise Agreement No. 1 for the Salt Lake City Area? 
Answer $ (•&& 
DATED +~ I 
Foreperson 
^e,^/ 
O r- r •'•f-. ,= 
SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST 
FIREMASTER FOR BREACH OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT NO. 2 
FOR THE RURAL UTAH FRANCHISE 
We the jury in the above entitled action, find the 
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to 
us: 
QUESTION NO. l: Do you find that the Franchise Agreement No. 2 
for the Salt Lake City Area constituted a valid and enforceable 
agreement between the parties? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: L>-\/£ 
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook fully 
performed his obligations under the Franchise Agreement No. 2 for 
the Salt Lake City Area? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: \**\ / \ 
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
/1 * •-
QUESTION NO. 3: Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was 
lawfully excused from performing his obligations under the 
contracts? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: M/5^ 
If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
^J^1 _ 
QUESTION NO. 4: Do you find that I'laiilLilf Baid llurErook 
wrongfully and without excuse or justification failed to pay 
Plaintiff the commissions and provide services set forth in 
Section 4 and 8 of the Franchise Agreement No. 2 for the Salt 
Lake City Area? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: Ly/]/^ 
if you answer Question No. 4 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 5: Do you find that the Defendant Firemaster's 
wrongful, unjustified or unexcused conduct approximately caused 
Plaintiff Bard Holbrook to suffer damages which were reasonably 
foreseeable? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: \A? ^ 
n 
If you answer Question Nc. 5 *r.c," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question Nc. 3 "yes," rhen answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 6; What is the rotal anrun- cf all damage suffered 
by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a resulr cf Jirezasterfs breach of 
Franchise Agreement No. 2 for the Rural Trah Franchise? 
Answer S / ^ ^ 
i'f>-n DATED 
Jcrecerson 
SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF BARD HOLBROOKfS CLAIM 
AGAINST DEFENDANT FIREMASTER FOR 
CONVERSION OF PLAINTIFF'S MONEY 
We the jury in the above entitled action, find the 
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to 
us: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did Plaintiff Bard Holbrook have an ownership 
interest in money in the possession of Firemaster? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: ^>^J 
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Did Defendant Firemaster willfully interfere 
with Plaintiff Bard Holbrookfs rights in that money without 
lawful justification? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: (s\ S ^ 
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 3: Was Plaintiff Bard Holbrook deprived of his 
rightful use and possession of money through Defendant 
Firemaster's conduct? 
Answer Yes or No, 
Answer: LAf^> <r 
If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 4: What amount of damages did Plaintiff Bard 
Holbrook suffer as a result of Defendant Firemasterfs improper 
retention of Plaintiff Bard Holbrook1s money? 
Answer s xo.axil 
QUESTION NO. 5; By improperly retaining money to be paid 
Plaintiff Bard Holbrook, did Defendant Firemaster act willfully 
or in reckless violation of Plaintifffs rights? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer <>]/S 
If you answer Question No. 5 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 5 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
02^744 
QUESTION NO. 6: What is the total amount of punitive damages, if 
any, that should be imposed against Defendant Firemaster? 
Answer $ J <P~72- J£ 
DATED 2 - s * ~^f y^Z* 
Foreperson 
07:1745 
SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF BARD HOLBROOK!S CLAIM 
OF BREECH OF FIREMASTER1S FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY 
We the jury in the above entitled action, find the 
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to 
us: 
QUESTION NO, 1: Did Plaintiff Bard Holbrook place confidence and 
trust in Defendant Firemaster by entrusting funds from sales and 
service which trust and confidence accepted by Defendant 
Firemaster? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: ^1/S 
If you answer Question No, 1 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Because of the special relationship of trust and 
confidence created between Plaintiff Bard Holbrook and Defendant 
Firemaster, did Defendant Firemaster have influence over 
Plaintiff Bard Holbrook and his property? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: LA aS 
Ulf yc ou answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 3: Did Defendant Firemaster wrongfully employ its 
uncommon influence for corporate gain? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: CyX $ 
If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 4: Was Plaintiff Bard Holbrook damaged as a direct 
and proximate consequence of Defendant Firemaster's wrongful 
conduct? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: £^kS 
It you answer Question No. 4 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 5: What is the total amount of all damage suffered 
by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a result of Defendant Firemaster's 
breach of its Fiduciary Duty? 
Answer: 
DATED: &- )d~7s 
Foreperson 
SPECIAL VERDICTS TO JURY 
QUESTION NO, 1; Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was 
forced to enter into the two Franchise Agreements under duress? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: 
QUESTION NO. 2: Do you find that Defendant Firemaster's actions 
regarding the payment of commissions should bar Defendant 
Firemaster from being able to enforce the Non-Competition and 
liquidated damages provisions of the contracts between the 
parties? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: lA/ £ 
QUESTION NO. 3: Do you find that the consideration of the 
Plaintiff was to receive under the contracts between the parties 
failed, thereby terminating his obligations under such contracts? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: ^l/S 
QUESTION NO. 4: Do you find that Defendant Firemaster waived its 
rights to require Plaintiff Bard Holbrook to perform his 
obligations under the territory agreement and Franchise contracts 
as a result of Defendant Firemaster's failure to pay commissions 
and provide services as set forth in the contracts? 
0^753 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: (^JO S 
QUESTION NO. 5: Do you find that Defendant Firemaster's prior 
failure to perform their obligations under the contracts 
justified Plaintiff's refusal to continue to perform under such 
contracts? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: ^1^3 
(!f.£7£0 
SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF BARD HOLBROOK'S CLAIM 
AGAINST DEFENDANT FIREMASTER FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
We the jury in the above entitled action, find the 
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to 
us: 
QUESTION NO, 1: Does Defendant Firemaster's conduct constitute a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
that Firemaster owed to Plaintiff Bard Holbrook under the 
Territory Agreement and the Franchise Agreements? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: (y\/S 
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Did Plaintiff Bard Holbrook suffer injury as a 
result of Defendant Firemaster's breach of its implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing? 
Answer Yes or No. 
Answer: L^\y^3 
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this 
verdict. If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the 
next question. 
002761 
QUESTION NO. 3: What is the total amount of all damages suffered 
by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a direct and proximate result of 
Defendant Firemaster's breach of its implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing? 
Answer: $ 5~c>/>*>*• ^>° 
Dated: 1~ I X-^S ^-jki^ >/^vt^-
Foreperson / 
QC^L2 
EXHIBIT C-
JOHN T. ANDERSON (0094) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants Master Protection 
Corporation and Robin D. Phillips 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
C ^ 1 ( & & 
Ck^y 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BARD N. HOLBROOK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MASTER PROTECTION CORPORATION 
dba FIREMASTER, a California 
corporation; ROBIN D. PHILLIPS; 
and, JOHN DOES 1-20, 
ORDER DISMISSING 
RACKETEERING CLAIMS 
CONTAINED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * 
Civil No. 900900445CN 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendants1 motion to dismiss plaintiff's second 
amended complaint dated July 25, 1990 (the "Second Amended Com-
plaint") came on regularly for hearing before the undersigned on 
September 6, 1990, at which time the court instructed plaintiff's 
counsel to file a more definite statement of the racketeering 
claims contained in the seventh and eighth claims of the Second 
Amended Complaint. Plaintiff subsequently filed his more defi-
nite statement dated September 21, 1990 (the "Statement"), in 
001671 
response to which defendants filed a formal written response and 
renewed their previously filed motion to dismiss the racketeering 
claims contained in the Second Amended Complaint. The court con-
ducted a hearing on the sufficiency of the Statement and the 
renewal of defendants' motion to dismiss the racketeering claims 
contained in the Second Amended Complaint on October 10, 1990 at 
11:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented at the hearing by his coun-
sel, Richard N. Bigelow of Martin & Bigelow. Defendants were 
represented by their counsel, John T. Anderson of Parsons Behle & 
Latimer. The court having reviewed the complete file of plead-
ings and papers in the case, and having heard and considered the 
arguments, stipulations and representations of counsel, and hav-
ing orally announced its ruling on the record, and having 
requested defendants' counsel to prepare and submit formal find-
ings consistent with its decision to dismiss the* racketeering 
claims contained in the Second Amended Complaint, and good cause 
appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED: 
1. The seventh and eighth claims for relief contained 
in the Second Amended Complaint which seek to impose liability on 
defendants under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-10-1601 et sea. ("UPUAA") and the Federal Racke-
teering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act contained in 18 
-2-
001B72 
U.S.C. S 1961 et. sea.. ("RICO") shall be, and they hereby are, 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the court 
specifically finds that (i) the choice of law provision contained 
in paragraph 19 of the parties1 franchise agreements dated 
April 11, 1988 is binding on, and enforceable by, the parties and 
precludes plaintiff from maintaining a claim under UPUAA* afreh 
>4Paoke^eeiri4^-"BBt4rvi^^ ft-ICO,— <>T 
3. This Order shall be without prejudice to defen-
dants' right under S 76-10-1605(8) of UPUAA to recover from 
plaintiff their reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees incurred 
to defend against, and obtain dismissal of, plaintiff's UPUAA 
claim. 
-3-
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ill M-
DATED this H-f day of OcLobeiv 1990 
BY THE COURT: 
-JUL 
Dl»STRI 
UUvt<»l<7 
I CT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^V~-4^ J*>~<u^ 
JOHRLT. ANDERSON 
RICHARD N. BIGELOW, ESQ. 
382/101290A 
-4- 001674 
